Organised crime and social media: detecting and corroborating weak signals of human trafficking online by Andrews, Simon et al.
Organised Crime and Social Media; detecting
and corroborating weak signals of Human
Trafficking online
Simon Andrews1,2, Ben Brewster2, and Tony Day2
1 Conceptual Structures Research Group
Department of Computing
2 Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime
Research
Communication and Computing Research Centre
Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
{s.andrews, b.brewster, t.day}@shu,ac,uk
Abstract. This paper describes an approach for detecting the presence
or emergence of Organised Crime (OC) signals on Social Media. It shows
how words and phrases, used by members of the public in Social Media,
can be treated as weak signals of OC, enabling information to be classi-
fied according to a taxonomy of OC. Formal Concept Analysis is used to
group information sources, according to Crime and Location, thus pro-
viding a means of corroboration and creating OC Concepts that can be
used to alert police analysts to the possible presence of OC. The ana-
lyst is able to ‘drill down’ into an OC Concept of interest, discovering
additional information that may be pertinent to the crime. The paper
describes the implementation of this approach into a fully-functional pro-
totype software system, incorporating a Social Media Scanning System
and a map-based user interface. The approach and system are illustrated
using the Trafficking of Human Beings as an example. Real data is used
to obtain results that show that weak signals of OC have been detected
and corroborated, thus alerting to the possible presence of OC.
1 Introduction
The vociferous proliferation of the Internet, and more recently Social Media,
into society and the everyday lives of its citizens has, over the last fifteen or
so years, resulted in a sea-change in the behaviours and perceptions we have in
relation to the information that is shared freely online [14]. Such behaviour has
resulted in the creation of a vast repository of information that holds potential
value for police investigations, and the emergence of the open-source researcher
as a valuable skill-set within the analytical repertoire of the police and security
agencies. Resources such as social media, RSS news feeds, interactive street-maps
and online directory services all provide valuable stores of information that can
be used to support existing investigative and analytical practices in response to
serious and organised crime. This paper focuses on the identification, extraction
and corroboration of data from social media using automated data acquisition,
natural language processing and formal concept analysis (FCA), specifically in
order to identify what we will refer to as ‘weak signals’ of human trafficking,
and to transform these signals into corroborated alerts linked to the presence or
emergence of human trafficking activity.
The concept of weak signals is abstracted from the Canadian Criminal In-
telligence Service’s (CISC) definitions of primary and secondary indicators [16],
and the perception that in reality there is little tangible value to be extracted
from isolated indicators as there is potential for them to be indicative of a va-
riety of phenomena. However, when these indicators are grouped under certain
conditions, such as proximity to a certain location and type of activity, they can
begin to provide insights into to the presence or emergence of crime. It is with
this definition, and the notion of ‘weak signals’ that we use as the basis of this
paper and the approached presented within it.
Perhaps the greatest shift in the use of the internet over the last 10-15 years
or so is the relative phenomenon which is the usage of Social Media among nor-
mal citizens. In the aftermath of the events which followed the killing of Mark
Duggan in 2011, a HMIC commissioned review highlighted significant inefficien-
cies in the the way that authorities were equipped to deal with social media as an
intelligence source [11]. Social media intelligence, or ‘SOCMINT’, provides op-
portunities for providing insights into events and groups, enhancing situational
awareness, and enabling the identification of criminal intent [12].
In order to demonstrate the potentially utility of SOCMINT, in respect of
identifying the presence and/or emergence of organised crime, the problem do-
main of Human Trafficking will be used as the exemplar throughout this paper.
Human trafficking operates on a vast scale, impacting upon almost every coun-
try in the world as an origin, transit or destination location for the movement
and exploitation of human beings. Trafficking is so defined by article 3 of the
Palermo protocol as the ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coer-
cion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation’ [17].
Europol [5] has in the past acknowledged the growing criminal dependence on
the internet and the increasingly trans-European perspective of serious and or-
ganised crime. These changes in the way that information is created and shared,
combined with the diversity in the way that existing forms of criminality are
being conducted provides the opportunity, and desire, for the development of
new means to assist law enforcement in combating such crime. To provide one
such approach to enable this, the tools described here facilitate the identifica-
tion, extraction, processing, analysis and presentation of data from open sources,
such as social media, that can provide insight into the emergence and presence
of crime. While at one end of the scale international intelligence agencies such
as the CIA’s PRISM programme are facillitating the aquisitoin, fusion and anal-
ysis of vast amounts of data from disperate sources, the (known) resources and
capability of law enforcement agencies (both locally, regionally and even inter-
nationally) are much more modest with the use of data from open sources and
social media often a manual task, and the remit of just a few specialist analysts
and officers within each force.
2 Taxonomy of Organised Crime
In beginning to model its constituent elements it is necessary to ascertain a
thorough understanding of the actual problem domain - human trafficking, by
drawing upon established definitions used to describe and diagnose the problem
by the practitioner base. The UNODC [17] have defined, using the UN Palermo
protocol as the basis, what they refer to as, the three constituent ‘elements’ of
trafficking, these being the ‘act’, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’, see Figure 1. Firstly,
the ‘Act’ refers to what is being done, this can include context such as whether
and how the victim has been recruited, transported, transferred or harboured.
The question of how this is being achieved is answered by the ‘Means’ which
seeks to establish whether force is being used as the basis of manipulation,
such as through kidnapping, abduction or the exploitation of vulnerabilities, or
more subtle methods such as through fraud, imposing financial dependencies or
coercion. The final element, the ‘Purpose’ establishes the reason why the act
and means are taking place, or to put it simply - the form of exploitation behind
the act and means, be it for forced labour, sexual exploitation and prostitution,
organ harvesting or domestic servitude.
Fig. 1. The Elements of Human Trafficking
Fig. 2. Organised Crime Taxonomy (excerpt)
This definition and categorisation provides an ideal underpinning for the
formation of a taxonomy of Human Trafficking that can be used to form the
basis of an approach to automatically identify and extract valuable data from
open sources (Figure 2). This taxonomy in actuality forms part of a larger model,
consisting of elements of a broader range of organised crime threats, including the
cultivation and distribution of illegal narcotics. The elements of the taxonomy
are defined across for types, visualised here using vertical lanes. The first of
these four lanes starting on the left is used as a high level categorisation used
to separate between different crime types. The second lane deals with different
elements within a specific type of crime - in this case one of the three component
parts of trafficking, while subsequent lanes, type and element, are used to show
further more specialised aspects of these elements.
Each of the nodes contained within the taxonomy represents a ruleset de-
signed to determine content’s, in this case a particular twitter posting, relevance
to the subject matter - Human Trafficking. The level of specialisation of the rules
themselves follows the structure of the taxonomy, moving from more generic
words or phrases that may indicate Human Trafficking used at the higher levels
of the taxonomy, where as as the more specialised end of the taxonomy, more
nuanced rules that may allude to the presence of criminality are used.
3 Weak Signals of Organised Crime
To enable the development of a taxonomy to begin to model and structure the
information deemed useful to extract we can refer to a wealth of literature from
both academic and practitioner perspectives that provide insights into the factors
that contribute to and indicate organised crime. These indicators vary from high
level, secondary information such as Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Techno-
logical, Legal and Environmental (PESTLE) factors, right down to operationally
oriented information that helps us to identify potential victims of trafficking. Ex-
isting models to anticipate changes and developments in organised criminality
accross geographic areas have focused on this kind of data alongside existing
crime statistics [20].
In the past, and to some extent a problem that still exists, a lack of infor-
mation and common understanding about what human trafficking is has hin-
dered the impact and effectiveness of efforts to combat it [19]. Despite varied
and wide-ranging counter-trafficking initiatives from NGO’s, Law Enforcement
and Governments, reliable information regarding the magnitude and nature of
trafficking across regional and national borders is still hard to come by due to
a number of issues around the sharing, fusion and understanding of data that
is already being collected [9]. The purpose of the approach developed and de-
scribed in this paper is not to provide a statistically accurate representation of
the presence and emergence of trafficking but rather to increase the access and
usability of data from previously untapped open-sources. In previous work, we
have discussed indicators across a three-level model [2] moving from credible
and accepted indicators of trafficking at level 1 of the model, through to the
observations and content created online, including on social media, by citizens
regarding these ‘weak signals’.
In this paper we discuss the latter and more specifically the modelling and use
of this information as ‘weak signals’ that allude to the presence and/or emergence
of criminality in citizen generated content, whilst using the formal definitions
and doctrine that exists to underpin the framework and organisation of the
model itself. Perhaps the most comprehensive list of indicators comes from the
UNODC [18] provide an extensive list of indicators categorised by different types
of exploitation such as; domestic servitude, child, sexual exploitation, labour
exploitation and begging/petty crime - the labels used in the taxonomy structure
outlined in Fig. 2. Using sexual exploitation as an example indicators include
things such as the appearance that persons are under the specific control of
another, that the person(s) appear to own little clothing, appear to rely on their
employer for basic amenities, transport and accommodation and more. Although
in this form, these indicators are quite abstract and it can may be potentially
difficult to see how they may manifest in real, open-source, data - it is possible to
develop rules looking for keywords and phrases that can provide ‘weak-signals’
of their existence online.
In order to facilitate the identification and extraction of these weak signals in
social media and other open-sources, what we will refer to as ‘contextual extrac-
tion’ methods [3] are used in order to identify, and subsequently extract, key en-
tities and facts (i.e. previously unknown relationships between different entities)
from the data. This approach to information extraction using natural-language
processing builds upon the existing principles of template ased information ex-
traction [15] , also sometimes referred to as ‘Atomic Fact Extracton’ [3] These
‘facts’ enable the extraction of entities within a specific context, i.e. locations in
relation to an arrest or type of exploitation on a per sentence basis.
While in isolation, the extraction of these entities on their own does not
necessarily provide much actionable information, it is possible using rules that
attempt to infer relations between them to begin to make some assumptions
about the data and its content. For example a single tweet may contain multiple
locations and other entities, but without some means to establish a relationship
between the two there is no way to automatically infer, with any confidence at
least, that they are linked. Fortunately, through the use of contextual extrac-
tion, and the aforementioned ‘facts’ we can infer these relationships in a number
of ways, using prepositions, parts-of-speech tagging and Boolean operators that
specify distance between words and other parameters. As the examples in dis-
cussed in this paper refer to data from Twitter only, these relationships are
done on a ‘per sentance’ basis. The following example shows how this works
in practice: From these rules we can begin to make some assumptions about
Fig. 3. Entity and Fact Extraction in Social Media
the entities being extracted. For example, it is now possible to ascertain with a
degree of confidence that specific locations are in reference to a specific event.
At this point, it is important to acknowledge the challenges posed by the use
of SMS-language (textese) as communication via services such as twitter do not
necessarily adhere to strict grammer or syntax conventions. Although a number
of novel approaches to handle this type of language are in development (see, for
example [13]) due to the use of examples that use accepted, formal teminology,
we do not address this issue here.
4 Categorisation and Filtering
In addition to extracting facts and entities from the input data, similarly tech-
niques are also utilised as the basis of a rule based approach to classify content
against a number of pre-defined categories. Membership to one or more of these
categories is then used as the basis for content filtering. If the content analysed
by the crawler does not meet the criteria of at least one of the rules within the
parameters defined in the content categorisation process, it is then disregarded.
The categorisation model is defined using a similar approach to the entity and
fact extraction model, utilising a number of ‘hand-crafted’ rules organised in a
hierarchical structure, with the only key difference being that rather than being
designed to identify and extract specific pieces of data and/or information they
aim to discern the relevance of the content against the defined topics using the
same taxonomy structure defined in Fig 2. The rules themselves use a range of
techniques, again focusing on the identification of keywords and phrases.A num-
ber of examples of the phrases and keywords used as part of the categorisation
taxonomy are shown in table 1.
Weak Signal Keywords and Phrases
Physical Injury subjected to violence
timid
forced to have sex
women beaten
Physical Appearance provocative dress
live with a group of women
unhappy
Unable to leave place of residence afraid to leave
under control of others
financially dependant
Irregular movement of individuals men come and go at all hours
women do not appear to leave
lots of activity at night
Table 1. Weak Signals - Keywords and Phrases
5 A Social Media Scanning System
To implement the content extraction and categorisation models, an integrated
pipeline that facilitates the crawling of social media is put in place. This process
manages and enables the seamless collection, restructuring, processing, filtering
and output of the data in preparation for further analysis. The stages of the
data preparation and processing pipeline is shown in Fig. 4.
Utilising the ‘Search API’ offered by Twitter [8], queries can be made against
the service’s index of recent and/or popular posts from the previous seven days,
with only the most relevant tweets returned from during the time period. At the
time of writing, the amount of data returned is limited by the API’s rate limit,
current set at 180 queries per 15 minutes. This amount is subject to change. In
Fig. 4. Social Media Scanning Process
terms of the queries themselves, a number of pre-defined operators exist that
allow for the matching of keywords, exact phrases and other operations.
6 Corroborating Information using Formal Concept
Analysis
A single Tweet containing a weak signal of OC is not a sensible basis for Law
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to take action. However, if a number of sources
contain weak signals of the same element of OC from the same location, then this
may form a credible basis to warrant further investigation. Such corroboration
can be automated by the application of Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) [6] to
the structured data extracted from the information sources. FCA can be used
to cluster the sources into so-called OC Threat Concepts (or just OC Concepts)
where one shared attribute is a location and another shared attribute is an
element of OC. When mining the data for formal concepts, if a minimum support
is set, say 10 information sources, only OC Threat Concepts with a least 10
sources will be obtained.
To carry out FCA, the structured data extracted from the information sources
must be scaled into a formal context. For example, each location in the data be-
comes a formal attribute in the context. The weak signals of elements of OC
are scaled using the Taxonomy. So, for example, a weak signal may indicate
Human Trafficking, and thus the source in which the signal was contained will
be labeled with the formal attribute Crime-HumanTrafficking. Several different
weak signals may all point to Human Trafficking, and thus sources containing
any of them would all be labeled with the attribute Crime-HumanTrafficking.
Other weak signals may point to more specific elements of Human Traffick-
ing, such as Exploitation which is a component of Human Trafficking (from the
taxonomy). A source with such a weak signal will be labeled with both Crime-
HumanTrafficking and Element-Exploitation. Thus the general ‘is a part of’ rule
in a taxonomy becomes naturally scaled in FCA (see Figure 5).
Using a data set created from 29096 Tweets as information sources, obtained
by scanning for Tweets containing weak signals of OC, a formal context was
created by scaling the extracted structured data as above. Using a minimum
support of 80, the context was mined for OC Threat Concepts using a modi-
fication of the In-Close concept miner [1]. The result is visualised as a formal
concept tree in Figure 6.
OC Taxonomy Human Trafficking Exploitation Sexual CSE
weak signal of THB ×
weak signal of Exploitation × ×
weak signal of Sexual Exploitation × × ×
weak signal of CSE × × × ×
Fig. 5. A Formal Context scaling part of the OC Taxonomy (CSE is Child Sexual
Exploitation)
In the tree, the head node is the concept containing all the Tweets from con-
cepts that satisfy the minimum support (5512 Tweets) and each of the branches
is to an OC Concept - a concept where one attribute is a location and another
is an OC. In this example, every OC is Human Trafficking as this was the type
of OC being searched for by the Scanning System. The number inside each node
is simply a concept ID number assigned by the concept miner. The number
outside the node, below the list of attributes, is the object count (the number
of Tweets contained in the concept) and in each case this is above the mini-
mum support threshold of 80. Thus concept 53, for example, has the attributes
authorlocation-Atlanta and Crime-HumanTrafficking, and has 185 objects. In
other words, within the data set there are 185 Tweets that have the author lo-
cation Atlanta and contain a weak signal of Human Trafficking. With this high
level of corroboration, a police analyst will be alerted to investigate this further,
and a possible next step in the investigation is automated by FCA in the form
of a ‘drill-down’ to the OC Concept’s sub-concepts.
6.1 OC Concept Drill-Down
The OC Concepts in Figure 6 contain limited information - they only have a
location and the OC Human Trafficking. However, individual Tweets in the OC
Concept may contain further information pertinent to the OC. But examining
185 Tweets, for example, although far less work than examining 29096 Tweets, is
nonetheless quite time consuming. However, several Tweets in the OC Concept
may all share the same additional information and this can be divulged by
examining the sub-concepts of an OC Concept. Each of the sub-concepts will
have the same location and crime as the original OC Concept but with one or
more additional attributes from the structured data extracted from the Tweets.
Such a result can easily be obtained by mining the data for concepts that contain
the attributes of the OC Concept and at the same time reducing the minimum
support required.
Figure 7 shows a concept tree with the ‘Atlanta’ OC Concept from Figure 6
and its sub-concepts produced when the minimum support is set to 5.
In the tree, concept 3 shows that 10 of the 185 ‘Atlanta’ Tweets also contain
a reference to the drug amphetamine. They may not all contain the actual word
amphetamine, but they will all contain a word or phrase that is commonly used
Fig. 6. Tree of OC Concepts
to mean or refer to amphetamine. But using lists of such words and phrases,
the entity extraction process carried to produce the structured data will thus
label each of these Tweets with the attribute drug-amphetamine, which in turn
enables the FCA to group them together.
Concept 2 shows that 6 of the 185 Atlanta Tweets also contain the location
Central America and the county Mexico. Furthermore, a semantic rule in the
entity extraction process has determined that Mexico is being referred to in
the Tweet as a trafficking location and thus these Tweets are labeled with the
attribute traffickinglocation-Mexico.
Concept 1 shows that 10 of the 185 Atlanta Tweets contain weak signals
of the OC Human Trafficking element Exploitation and the exploitation type
Sexual. Furthermore, in 8 of those 10 Tweets there are weak signals of CSE,
further specialising the OC.
Thus, through this simple automated process, the police analyst has po-
tentially more information that may be pertinent to an OC and more specific
information regarding the nature of the OC. Because the original OC Concept
involved corroboration by a large number of sources, the analyst can gain some
Fig. 7. Drill-Down for the ‘Atlanta’ OC Concept
confidence that further information contained in sub-sets of the Tweets has cred-
ibility. Indeed, the analyst may now want to trace back to the original Tweets
(or to the text of these Tweets) and, because they have been grouped together
by FCA, it is simple task to provide this facility.
7 Implementation
The processes and components described above were implemented as a part of
the European ePOOLICE Project [4]. The OC Taxonomy and entity extraction
components developed by the authors (with assistance from people acknowl-
edged below) were implemented in the system to provide data to be consumed
by various analytic components, one of which was the FCA ‘OC Threat Cor-
roboration’ component described above. The user interface to the system was
developed by other colleagues at Sheffield Hallam University (who are also ac-
knowledged below). The system allows a police analyst to select a region and
type of OC to scan for and then acquire sources on the Internet (such as Tweets)
that match those search criteria. Structured data is extracted automatically from
the sources, as described above, allowing the user to carry out a variety of an-
alytic tasks and display the results in an appropriate visualisation. For many
of the analytics, including the FCA Threat Corroboration a map-based visual-
isation is used. Figure 8 shows the user interface with the FCA ‘Corroborated
Threats’ option selected. There are a number of other options listed and these
components were developed by other members of the ePOOLICE consortium. It
is out of scope for this paper to describe them here, but for more information
please visit the project website [4].
The map of the USA in Figure 8 is displaying the San Diego and Atlanta
OC Concepts from Figure 6. Various icons are used by the system to indicate
types of OC and the one here is for Human Trafficking. The analyst is able to
select an OC Concept to display its information and to drill down to its sub-
concepts. The Atlanta OC Concept has been selected and is thus displaying
its associated information, including its attributes (crime: humantrafficking and
location: atlanta) and its objects, listed as URLs. The ‘drill-down’ sub-concepts
(from Figure 7) are being displayed as icons below the main concept and Figure
9 shows the additional information shown when one of these sub-concepts is
selected - in this case the attribute drug: amphetamine. The 10 sources that
contain a reference to amphetamine are listed and at this point the analyst may
wish to look at some of these. Clicking on a URL will take the user to the original
source.
Fig. 8. ePOOLICE system showing San Diego and Atlanta OC Concepts and details
of the Atlanta OC Concept
7.1 Evaluation and Concluding Remarks
Although difficult to evaluation in an operational sense (we cannot, for example,
act as the police in investigating organised crime) it is possible to say something
about the quality of the results in terms of the accuracy of the weak signals.
A sample of 20 inferred OC categories were inspected against the original text
sources, with 16 out of 20 correctly identified from weak signals as being crime
Fig. 9. ePOOLICE system showing Drill-Down information
related. In the other four cases, the context within which the identified words
or phrases were used clearly indicated that the source was not referring to OC.
Although only a small sample, this was an encouraging level of false positives.
Further evaluation is required, however, on larger samples to produce a statisti-
cally significant result.
A qualitative evaluation was provided by 24 end-users during a hands-on
feedback session held in December 2015. Various law enforcement agencies from
within the EU were represented, including those from a regional, national and in-
ternational organisations. The challenges for the use of the system operationally
centred on factors such as the need to refer to personal and sensitive information
about the origins of the information extracted and corroborated using the sys-
tem, and the complexity of the way in which the systems outputs were presented
via the map-based interface. However, the utility of the system in providing a
means to show trends in current, and alluding to emerging, forms of criminality
in different geographic areas was overwhelmingly positive, especially through the
utilisation of previously untapped data sources such as social media.
Legal and Ethical Disclaimer No data that can or may be considered sen-
sitive or personal has been handled as a result of the research undertaken. The
authors do however acknowledge, despite being outside of the scope of the re-
search present, that in practice the operational utility of such a system would be
dependant on the use of data thay may be considered personal and/or sensitive.
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